Annapolis Conference: a ray of hope or not?

The Annapolis Conference for Middle East is over; and if we are to adopt without any question what Secretary Rice says, we should rejoice and celebrate, for the objective of the talks has been achieved. "The success of this meeting is really in the launch of negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians for the establishment of a Palestinian state and therefore a two-state solution," she said. But how close is this statement to reality?

Furthermore, which should be the ultimate end of the U.S policy efforts as far as the Palestine issue is concerned? Should it be merely the creation of a Palestinian state or something more? And how does the Annapolis Conference serve this end? (If it does so).

It is obvious that the final end of the Conference shouldn't be merely the establishment of a Palestinian state. For example, if a Palestinian state is established, which – however – is in conflict with the Israeli state, should we be glad about it? Certainly not! Therefore, U.S. policy's objective should be to ensure a lasting peace, rather than just establishing a state for the Arabs of Palestine. And, as a consequence, the results of the Annapolis Conference should be evaluated in regard to this objective.

It is evident that a lasting peace requires a permanent solution to the Middle East issue. Nevertheless, it is also evident that this solution cannot be a fair one. Hence, we should rather seek for an acceptable solution. And this practically means compromising.

There are 5 main problems, which consist the core of the Middle East issue:

• the borders of the Israeli state
• the refugees
• water
• the status of the city of Jerusalem
• the security of Israel

But, in spite of the fact that these five problems are interwoven with each other, still they can be reduced to two issues: the territorial one, and the issue of Israel's security.

By making this reduction, the pursuit of a settlement becomes easier, since these two issues have a cause-and-effect relation. Arabs' aggression against Israel is the result of the territorial problem, which arose because of the establishment of the Israeli state, and because of the way this state was established. And of course, it will not stop for as long as the territorial issue remains unsolved. Because a war is not a purpose to itself, but a means of physically forcing one's will on an opponent (“War is the continuation of politics through other means", von Clausewitz says.) And in this case, the political objective of the Arab hostility is a solution of the territorial issue, which will not be unilaterally dictated by Israel.

Bearing all these in mind, it is hard for me to share Secretary Rice's contentment, about the results of the Annapolis Conference. And I am saying so for two more reasons.

The first reason is related to the people who are to negotiate; I mean Mr. Olmert and Mr. Abbas. Because, even if we assume that they have the will to negotiate (and we shouldn't take for granted that both of them want to do so), still it is doubtful whether they have the power or the legitimation to do so.

Let’s begin with Mr. Olmert, whose position is far from being an envied one. Having become Prime minister by chance, he has been widely criticised since the unfortunate war he launched against Lebanon. His administration’s future is rather obscure, since he is the head of a ramshackle coalition government with the religious Far Right, which will certainly overrule him, if he attempts to make any real step towards a compromise with the Palestinians for the sake of a mutually acceptable solution. And as if these were not enough, it is possible for him to be indicted for scandals, depending on the results of the investigation, which is being run these days. (I guess that while he was in Annapolis, he was more concerned for the investigative report, rather than for the Conference itself.)

But if Mr. Olmert's position is difficult, Mr. Abbas' position is almost despairing. First, in the last Palestinian parliamentary election his party, Fatah, lost to the Islamic resistance movement Hamas (Hamas took 76 out of the 132 seats of the Parliament, whereas Fatah took only 43 of them); then, after forming a government which lacks legitimation, he suffered a second defeat – in the military field this time: he lost control over the Gaza stripe to Hamas. And although the West sees on Mr. Abbas a clement negotiator, his compatriots accuse him of being over-compliant. Which practically means that even if Mr. Abbas comes to the negotiations, and even if these negotiations reach to a final agreement, still this will be of little value; because if the terms of an agreement are not widely accepted (and Hamas has already dismissed the talks, saying that “Palestinians will not be bound by any decisions taken at this week's US-backed Middle East peace conference”), then no lasting peace will be secured.

But it is not only the negotiators that make me being sceptical about sharing Secretary Rice' contentment; It is also the whole process, which is supposed to lead to a final solution of the Palestine issue. I am talking about the so-called "Roadmap for Peace in the Middle East", which – I feel – is lacking common sense.

To be more exact, the Roadmap for Peace comprises three goal-driven phases: Phases II and III are related to the solution of the territorial issue and the establishment of a Palestinian state, whereas Phase I is related to ending the violence and terror, normalising the Palestinian life and building Palestinian Institutions. So far so good.

However, according to the Roadmap for Peace, in Phase I "Palestinians declare an unequivocal end to violence and terrorism and undertake visible efforts on the ground to arrest, disrupt, and restrain individuals and groups conducting and planning violent attacks on Israelis anywhere." And although the demand for an end to violence is perfectly logical, it is not logical at all to ask the Palestinians "to arrest, disrupt, and restrain individuals and groups conducting and planning violent attacks on Israelis anywhere"; because, as it has already been said, all this violence has a particular reason and a specific aim. By asking the Palestinians to consent to Roadmap’ Phase I, it is as if they are asked to relinquish their own fate to Israel's good will and generosity. They are asked to disarm, and in return they are given the obfuscated hope for an independent state. And, of course, this cannot be acceptable. Not to mention that such an attempt might lead to an intra-Palestinian civil war. For these reasons, the Roadmap for Peace cannot be an acceptable process for the seeking of a permanent solution.

So, as it has been shown, these who were invited to Annapolis Conference in order to represent the implicating parts, they do not have either the room to manoeuvre or the legitimation to negotiate. On the other hand, in this conference the US policy attempted to reactivate the Roadmap for Peace, which cannot be an acceptable basis for the talks. Hence, it is really hard for me to understand where Secretary Rice’s contentment is derived from.

I do not know. Perhaps some of you will think that I remind you of Cassandra. But do not forget: although Cassandra used to prophesise only doom and disaster, still, she was speaking the truth.